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Introduction
Whilst the protection of civilians (POC) in 
conflict has been a perpetual and recurring 
feature of the humanitarian discourse the 
same has not been true in military doctrines, 
where the protection of civilians has long 
been cast in terms of arms bearers uphold-
ing their responsibilities under international 
humanitarian law (IHL). However, opportu-
nities for and pressures on military actors 
to develop more specific capacities and 
approaches in this field have grown. This is 
partly a response to the changing nature, 
location and scope of conflict, particularly 
the increasing proportion of internal con-
flicts fought by irregular armed groups in 
urban environments. It is also a response 
to the scale and complexity of protection 
challenges in the Balkans, Rwanda, Darfur 
and Libya - each of which has clearly dem-
onstrated that threats to civilians are com-
plex and dynamic and that no single inter-
national actor is capable of mitigating them 
without significant support from other insti-
tutions (O’Callaghan and Pantuliano, 2007). 
Elsewhere Victoria Metcalfe (2012) argues 
that despite the resultant growth in oppor-
tunities for interaction between militaries 
and humanitarians in what is increasingly a 
shared endeavour, there is only a very limited 
literature on their interaction over protec-
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Whilst the protection of civilians (POC) in conflict has been a recurring feature of the 
humanitarian discourse the same has not been true in military doctrines, where the pro-
tection of civilians has long been cast in terms of arms bearers upholding their responsi-
bilities under international humanitarian law (IHL). However, opportunities for and pres-
sures on military actors to develop more specific capacities and approaches in this field 
have grown: partly as a response to the changing nature, location and scope of conflict, 
particularly the increasing proportion of internal conflicts fought by irregular armed 
groups in urban environments. It is also a response to the scale and complexity of pro-
tection challenges in the Balkans, Rwanda, Darfur and Libya - each of which has clearly 
demonstrated that threats to civilians are complex and dynamic and that no single inter-
national actor is capable of mitigating them without significant support from other insti-
tutions (O’Callaghan and Pantuliano, 2007). Despite the enormous growth in opportunities 
for interaction between militaries and humanitarians there is only a very limited literature 
on their interaction over protection issues and evaluations of the emerging doctrines. 
Consequently this article charts the growth in military policies towards POC in the UN, 
UK, NATO and a range of other states as well as drawing attention to the challenges that 
still remain in operationalising responses.
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tion issues and evaluations of the emerging 
doctrines. Consequently this article charts 
the growth in military policies towards POC 
and the challenges that still remain in their 
operationalisation.
What is the Protection of Civilians? 
Traditionally the concept of ‘protection’ has 
been relatively straightforward, rooted in 
IHL’s protection of civilians from the con-
sequences of war. As such, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has tra-
ditionally occupied a key role in its applica-
tion. Later conceptualisations of ‘protection’ 
have broadened to encompass elements of 
refugee law and international human rights 
law (IHRL), with the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) adopting a role cor-
responding to that of the ICRC. As a con-
sequence of the prominent roles played by 
both the ICRC and UNHCR, the implementa-
tion of protection has tended to reflect their 
mandates and operational approaches, mani-
festing itself as a ‘legally oriented, diplomatic 
and persuasive engagement with national 
state and non-state actors’ (O’Callaghan 
and Pantuliano 2007). Both the ICRC and 
the UN’s Inter Agency Standing Commit-
tee (IASC) reflect this quasi-legal approach; 
accepting that ‘the concept of protection 
encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining 
full respect for the rights of the individual in 
accordance with the letter and spirit of the 
relevant bodies of law (i.e., IHRL, IHL and 
refugee law)’ (ICRC 1999: 3). 
The Rise in Civilian Protection 
Discourse
The broader humanitarian community 
became increasingly concerned with the 
protection of civilians caught in the midst 
of armed conflict, particularly from the early 
1990s with the end of the Cold War. This 
reflected changing perceptions of the rela-
tionship between humanitarian action and 
warfare, ‘prompting humanitarian actors to 
think more deeply about the extent of their 
responsibility to provide more than relief 
alone’ (O’Callaghan and Pantuliano 2007: 1). 
Conflict in the Balkans, Somalia and Africa 
more generally resulted both in a greater 
understanding of the impact of war on civil-
ian populations as well as ‘the limitations 
and sometimes negative consequences of 
relief assistance’. These situations also led to 
a ‘greater emphasis in international policy 
spheres on a responsibility to protect’ and 
‘closer linkages between humanitarian action 
and the wider policy agenda’. This also encour-
aged a reconsideration of the boundaries of 
humanitarian action and the role and mean-
ing of protection within this space. Increas-
ingly ‘protection’ expanded from being the 
domain of the ICRC and UNHCR and took 
on a broader meaning which encompassed 
‘issues of civilian safety.’ Its importance also 
expanded organisationally as new humani-
tarian actors, particularly Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), adopted protection 
policies as part of their operational program-
ming and the UN cluster system established 
protection as one of the 11 core areas of 
humanitarian action (O’Callaghan and Pan-
tuliano 2007: 1). In practical terms this led to 
protection policies continuing to be pursued 
not only in terms of national-level dialogues 
between the traditional protection actors 
and state/non-state armed actors but also 
to its operationalisation by a much broader 
array of NGO actors working within com-
munities and ‘drawing on links with other 
political and military actors in their efforts 
to increase civilian safety’ (O’Callaghan and 
Pantuliano 2007: 2). 
The widening of the definition of civilian 
‘protection’ actors has undoubtedly compli-
cated agreement operational priorities even 
amongst the humanitarian community. This 
has been complicated further by the increas-
ing role of military forces in protection strat-
egies. Nevertheless, there are large areas of 
agreement that must not be overlooked. 
There is a broad acceptance within both the 
humanitarian community and military doc-
trine that the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict relates both to violations of IHL and 
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human rights law as well as encompassing 
a ‘broader spectrum of human security and 
human dignity’ (HPG 2011: 2) – and this is 
reflected in much of the military doctrine 
analysed later in this article. Despite the dif-
fering tactics and priorities, as well as the 
cultural difficulty of some humanitarians in 
accepting a military role in protection strate-
gies, both military and humanitarian actors 
recognise each other as having important 
contributions to make to a shared goal of 
reducing threats to civilians. Elsewhere, Met-
calfe argues that there exists a broad consen-
sus on the protection of civilians including 
three elements: ‘compliance by all parties to 
conflict with international humanitarian and 
human rights law; mitigating or reducing the 
threats and vulnerabilities of civilian popula-
tions; and, in the longer term, building a pro-
tective environment, including strengthen-
ing the capacities of the host state and local 
communities’ (HPG 2012: 1).
Nevertheless, profound differences in 
strategies and tactics have complicated rela-
tions not least of all because military support 
to the protection of civilians is not simply 
rooted in a humanitarian imperative (see 
Metcalfe, Haysom and Gordon 2012). Within 
the growing range of military doctrines on 
this subject protection is recognised both as 
a quasi-humanitarian obligation and, impor-
tantly, as an essentially pragmatic response 
to sustaining a viable peace and mission 
legitimacy. Holt et al. (2009: 14). stress the 
latter, arguing that protection is central to 
peacekeeping mandates because the ‘safety 
and security of civilians is critical to the 
legitimacy and credibility of peacekeeping 
missions. Missions rely upon their legiti-
macy with the local civilian population and 
external observers alike to help build peace 
and maintain political momentum behind 
the peace process. Moreover, wherever 
peacekeepers deploy they raise expectations 
amongst the local population - and among 
those who view missions from afar - that the 
reason for their presence is to support peo-
ple at risk. As seen in Rwanda, the Balkans, 
Sierra Leone, Haiti, DRC and Darfur, among 
others, peacekeeping operations that are 
ill-prepared to address large-scale violence 
directed against civilians will falter and may 
even collapse’ (Holt, Taylor and Kelly 2009). 
Ariela Blatter (2011: 2) echoes these themes, 
arguing that ‘civilian protection is essential 
because it is critical to the perceived success 
of peacekeeping operations and therefore 
the UN’s ability to work credibly in the field 
of peace and security.’ Similarly she suggests 
that POC is a prerequisite for establishing an 
enduring peace settlement whilst ‘prevent-
ing attacks on civilians also pre-empts spoil-
ers from creating instability and weakening 
fragile peace processes in post-war environ-
ments’. Furthermore, in its absence ‘humani-
tarian assistance cannot be provided by relief 
agencies, international and regional organi-
sations, and NGOs when civilians and third 
party providers are at risk of being attacked. 
The security of civilians is also a key aspect 
of providing development assistance in post-
conflict situations’ (Blatter 2011: 2).
The Growth in Military Roles in the 
Protection of Civilians 
The evolution of protection strategies within 
the humanitarian community has also 
been echoed in militaries, particularly those 
deployed under UN auspices. Since 1999, 
when the UN Security Council first authorised 
peacekeeping troops to use force to protect 
civilians under imminent threat of violence, 
the Security Council has increasingly man-
dated peacekeepers this right.1 The language 
of ‘civilian protection’ is now embedded in 
the majority of peacekeeping mandates2, 
either as an implicit or explicit function, and 
UN peacekeeping missions have often inno-
vated creatively in establishing viable con-
cepts of operations (O’Callaghan and Pantu-
liano 2007). 
The concept has also become increas-
ingly important within other international 
organisations with crisis management roles, 
such as NATO, the African Union (AU) and 
the European Union. NATO’s operations in 
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both Libya and Afghanistan have raised the 
significance of POC as a specific objective 
(i.e., rather than as a component of regime 
change or a counter insurgency strategy) and 
states like the United States and United King-
dom have increasingly placed the emphasis 
on conflict prevention in their national secu-
rity strategies. 
As a consequence of these trends, the mili-
tary protection of civilians in armed conflict 
has increasingly become both more impor-
tant and complex. The protection elements 
in the mandates of peacekeeping missions 
(UN and other international forces) extend 
beyond IHL obligations placed on the mili-
tary to uphold distinctions between combat-
ants and non-combatants. Such mandates 
focus more on establishing a safe environ-
ment, linking military conceptions of ‘protec-
tion’ to notions understood by humanitarian 
organisations and potentially creating ‘new 
areas where the lines between humanitar-
ian and military [action] are blurred’ (SCHR 
2010: 6). The practical challenges of ensuring 
the physical protection of people have also 
combined with normative shifts such as the 
increasing acceptance of the ‘Responsibility 
to Protect’ (R2P) to transform the problem 
from an essentially humanitarian one into 
one that is perceived to require a complex 
mix of political, humanitarian and often mil-
itary responses, particularly in the context of 
integrated mission approaches. 
Military Doctrinal Adaptation
Broadly speaking, military doctrines have 
tended to touch on protection in a piece-
meal fashion, treating it as an obligation of 
arms bearers to draw distinctions between, 
on the one hand, combatants and military 
objectives and, on the other, civilians and 
civil objectives (Beadle 2010: 7). Counter-
insurgency strategies routinely advocate sep-
arating civilian populations from insurgents 
and creating conditions for the extension of 
government authority and enablement of 
economic growth. It also features as an ele-
ment of stabilisation doctrines’ promotion 
of the extension of host nation governance 
and the protection of key persons and insti-
tutions (Gordon 2010). Whilst practically all 
military counter-insurgency and stabilisation 
doctrines enshrine elements of a POC strat-
egy, there is remarkably little on the mechan-
ics of how this would translate into a broader 
POC doctrine.
Several of the more recent publications 
described below have begun to frame protec-
tion as a more discrete component that is key 
to both stabilisation and counter insurgency, 
often in terms borrowed from the concept 
of human security. Nevertheless, its gener-
ally fragmentary treatment makes it difficult 
for POC to crystalise into a coherent frame-
work - a concept of operations - that is readily 
understood by soldiers and politicians alike. 
US Doctrinal Adaptation
In 2006, the US Army and Marine Corps 
released Counterinsurgency Field Manual 
3–24 (hereafter FM 3–24) under Army 
General David Petraeus and Marine Gen-
eral James Mattis. It was one of the earli-
est doctrinal adaptations to the conflicts in 
(principally) Iraq and Afghanistan – result-
ing primarily from the need to address the 
strategic drift in Iraq. Nevertheless, its influ-
ence was felt beyond the US military, being 
unofficially adopted as the NATO counter-
insurgency doctrine. It broke with the US 
Army’s former preoccupation with the deci-
sive use of military force, stressing instead a 
‘population-centric approach’, and sought to 
engineer a change in the strategic culture of 
the US military. Whilst its treatment of pro-
tection remained fragmentary, split between 
its desire to separate the insurgent from the 
general population and its IHL obligations, 
(FM 3–24: Appendix D) it framed the counter 
insurgency war as ‘a struggle for the popula-
tion’s support’ with the ‘protection, welfare, 
and support of the people’ being ‘vital to suc-
cess’ (FM 3–24: 1–159).
US Joint Publication 3–07.3 entitled ‘Peace 
Operations’ (2007) introduces elements of 
a strategy for the protection of civilians, but 
this tends to focus on protecting the civil-
ian components of an international mis-
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sion, referring obliquely to the international 
humanitarian community, especially in what 
it labels as ‘foreign humanitarian assistance’ 
missions. As strategic doctrine it perhaps 
intentionally sidesteps what the protection of 
civilians would demand in terms of a concept 
of operations. However it does draw out an 
approach that may involve the forcible sepa-
ration of belligerents, support to host nation 
institutions and security apparatus, the main-
tenance of law and order, the protection of 
civilians and public officials, the direct pro-
tection of NGOs, Other Government Agen-
cies (OGAs) and the military providing what 
it labels as ‘humanitarian assistance’ (section 
II-2). It argues that this might involve the 
protection of safe areas as well as the pro-
tection of logistical hubs, corridors and dis-
tribution centres. When opposed by one or 
more belligerents humanitarian assistance 
may also involve the direct delivery of aid 
by the military. Whilst many of these activi-
ties are potentially valid, the doctrine itself is 
piecemeal and tends to focus on humanitar-
ian commodities, logistics and international 
staff rather than the safety of host nation 
civilians. It also presumes the capacity of 
the host nation to directly provide a secure 
environment or to do this in an acceptable 
timeframe with external support. This may 
not always be a realistic set of assumptions.
In 2008 the Army revised its field manual 
on basic operations, known as Field Manual 
(FM) 3–0, ‘to elevate stability operations to 
an essential core competency - as important 
as defeating foreign enemies and protecting 
the U.S. from attack’ (Ackerman 2008: 5). It 
also published FM 3–07, the Stability Opera-
tions field manual. None of these contained 
a systematic treatment of POC although all 
stressed the multidimensional nature of the 
contemporary military operating environ-
ment. FM 3–07, for example, emphasises the 
protection of urban infrastructure and the 
seat of government, the avoidance of collat-
eral damage, as well as the requirement to 
address the range of factors that generate 
lawlessness, insurgency and subversion. It 
also referred to the purpose of Civil-Military 
Operations as building support for the host 
government, but again POC is not pursued 
as an end in itself nor does it offer anything 
resembling a framework of operations.3
UK Doctrinal Adaptation
In 2009, the UK military produced its equiva-
lent to FM 3–24, the Joint Doctrine Publica-
tion 3–40: Security and Stabilisation: The 
Military Contribution (hereafter JDP 3–40). 
It borrowed heavily from US approaches but 
also sought to infuse the UK’s broader lessons 
from its more civilian-oriented approach to 
stabilisation. Whilst both the US’s FM 3–24 
and the UK’s JDP 3–40 stressed the need to 
develop the support of the population, JDP 
3–40 perhaps went further in its emphasis 
on human security as being one of the keys to 
the consolidation of tactical military success 
whilst also being a prerequisite for economic 
and political progress. It argued that ‘win-
ning the contest for human security [against 
the insurgents]’ is ‘fundamental to the devel-
opment of host nation government author-
ity and, ultimately, security of the state’ (FM 
3–07: 513). It suggested that the provision 
of protection to the population ‘stimulates 
economic activity and supports longer-term 
development and governance reform. Impor-
tantly POC generates confidence in local peo-
ple about their own security satiation – their 
collective human security – and an economic 
interest in ongoing stability. It also denies 
adversarial groups one of the principal strat-
egies for expanding their support base’ (FM 
3–07: 514). Unlike many of the other doctri-
nal developments of the early part of the dec-
ade, JDP 3–40 provides a range of suggested 
techniques for implementing such a strat-
egy, including the: (i) static protection of key 
sites, e.g. market places and refugee camps; 
(ii) persistent security in areas secured and 
held, e.g. intensive patrolling and check-
points; (iii) targeted action against adversar-
ies, e.g. search or strike operations; and (iv) 
population control, e.g. curfews and vehicle 
restrictions (FM 3–07: 515).
Despite the emergence of a more coher-
ent civilian protection framework, JDP 3–40 
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places more emphasis on working with civil-
ians from other branches of the UK govern-
ment than it does on civilian protection per 
se. POC is largely absent from other British 
doctrinal submissions. Joint Warfare Publica-
tion JWP 3–50, The Military Contribution to 
Peace Support Operations (Second Edition) 
makes brief mention of the need for rule of 
law and the protection of human rights, but 
again provides no systematic treatment of 
the concept of POC. The Army Field Manual 
‘Counter Insurgency’ only goes as far as refer-
ring to ‘operations to secure key centers of 
population allow the host government to 
demonstrate its capability, and allow it to 
start to instill confidence among the people 
in its competence and long-term intentions’ 
(UK MoD 2009: 3–8). Similarly the Joint 
Medical Doctrine FM 4–03 makes scant men-
tion of the Army medical services’ potential 
contribution except in so far as it is an obli-
gation under IHL. The UK Stabilisation Unit’s 
2008 publication ‘The UK Approach to Stabi-
lisation: Stabilisation Unit Guidance Notes’, 
whilst claiming to enshrine emerging the 
UK’s experience and best practice, provides 
very little on the importance of civilian pro-
tection and its role in delivering stabilisation. 
The most coherent treatment of the sub-
ject is found in the UK MOD’s ‘Peacekeeping: 
An Evolving Role For Military Forces’ Joint 
Doctrine Note 5/11 (JDN 5/11). This docu-
ment provides a holding position pending 
a more thoroughgoing review of JWP 3–50 
(The Military Contribution to Peace Support 
Operations) and is also intended to inform 
the ongoing review of NATO doctrine on 
peace support operations. 
Whilst offering less on the operationalisa-
tion of civilian protection than JWP 3–404 
and falling short on providing a viable con-
cept of operations for civilian protection, it 
does make several valuable contributions, 
stressing both the multidimensional nature 
of civilian protection in peacekeeping opera-
tions and the probability and importance of 
a civilian lead and integrated approaches to 
planning (JDN 5/11: 406–7) a civilian pro-
tection strategy
It also picks up a number of traditional 
themes: the importance of understanding 
the political context, the challenge of ‘posi-
tioning’ in relation to potential and actual 
spoilers and difficulties in maintaining 
impartiality in the use of force. It also iden-
tifies that the civilian protection tasks are 
‘particularly resource-intensive and inevita-
bly require more resources than are available 
to the mission’ (JDN 5/11: 409). Its solution 
is to enhance planning in order to recognise 
early the impact and address the problem 
‘collectively among the peacekeeping com-
munity either through corralling resources 
with other actors or prioritizing the most 
vulnerable population centres’. Highlighting 
the traditional challenge of implementing 
civilian protection it argues that the ‘mis-
sion must accept risk elsewhere. Risk should 
be mitigated where possible through con-
tingency planning, including the manage-
ment of local expectations.’ Whilst the doc-
trine effectively identifies the challenges in 
establishing a civilian protection concept of 
operations, it provides little advice on what 
approaches might prove useful in resolving 
these issues. 
Whilst JDN 5/11 is the latest offering from 
the MoD, it should be read in conjunction 
with the ‘UK Government Strategy on The 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.’ 
With the United Kingdom, as the chair of 
the informal Security Council Expert Group 
on the Protection of Civilians (established in 
2009), it is unsurprising that the British gov-
ernment has developed a cross-departmental 
approach. Understandably the document is 
more strategic in nature than the JDN and 
establishes four policy areas for joint action 
principally between MOD, FCO and DFID: 
(i) political engagement, (ii) protection by 
peace support operations, (iii) humanitarian 
action and (iv) state capacity.
Within the second policy area it commits 
to a greater ‘emphasis on protection issues, 
where appropriate, in Security Council peace 
operation mandates, and for better imple-
mentation of mandates by DPKO and troop 
contributing countries.’ It also discusses the 
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use of ‘better and more consistent language 
on protection in peace support operation 
mandates; better reporting on protection 
issues by peace operations; better execution 
of protection tasks within a peace operation 
and more capable troop and police contrib-
uting nations on protection issues.’ In par-
ticular it commits to supporting the ‘UN to 
further develop the necessary doctrine, guid-
ance and training to ensure that the protec-
tion of civilians elements of peace operation 
mandates can be implemented consistently 
and coherently by the UN system to make 
operations more effective (FCO 2010: 11).
NATO Doctrine
Gaps also exist in NATO doctrine. Allied Joint 
Publication 9 (AJP-9), NATO Civilian-Military 
Cooperation and AJP-3.4(A) Allied Joint Doc-
trine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Opera-
tions’ and lower level doctrine such as ATP-
3.4.1.1 ‘Peace Support Operations Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures’ are all pertinent 
to this discussion. Despite overt recogni-
tion of the importance of ‘human security’ 
(see AJP 3.4–4), much NATO doctrine tends 
to treat POC as an implicit product of the 
restraint of arms carriers rather than as a 
discrete approach in its own right - arguably 
reflecting NATO’s historical role in defending 
national territories rather than protecting 
foreign individuals, as well as national politi-
cal cultures where the protection of civilian 
populations is primarily the responsibil-
ity of host governments and civilian police 
forces. In this approach the principles of 
distinction (particularly drawing distinctions 
between military targets and civilian per-
sons or objects) and proportionality (limiting 
the collateral damage entailed by attacking 
military objectives) are rooted in an assump-
tion that warfare is about compelling enemy 
combatants to submit and that targeting 
civilians provides little strategic value (Brud-
erlein 1999: 430). It is also based on a belief 
that states will hold to account their armed 
forces. In this sense current NATO doctrines 
are more appropriate a non-interventionist 
Cold War territorial alliance but have clearly 
been stretched by operations in Afghanistan 
and Libya. Arguably, this is surprising given 
NATO’s previous roles in using force to pro-
tect civilians in both Bosnia (1994–1995) 
and Kosovo (1999).
Whilst not treated as a distinct topic in any 
NATO doctrine, there are several components 
of a protection strategy including frequent 
mention of the restoration of law and order, 
the protection of humanitarian organisa-
tions, the creation of a safe and secure envi-
ronment, freedom of movement, the preser-
vation of basic human rights and support to 
investigations into abuses of human rights. 
NATO’s AJP-9 publication, clearly reflecting 
NATO’s experiences in the Balkans, specifi-
cally mentions the possibility of a NATO-led 
peace enforcement mission ending wide-
spread human rights abuses and restoring 
the rule of law as a precursor to handing 
the operation over to a UN (or other) peace-
keeping force or the host nation. It also goes 
somewhat further in identifying an opera-
tional POC doctrine than the US equivalent, 
drawing attention to a potential role in estab-
lishing a ‘secure environment’ which may 
be ‘extended to include the safeguarding of 
individuals, communities and institutions’ 
(AJP-9 2003: 6–7). However, it is clumsy 
in its explanation as to how this would be 
achieved, arguing that a peace support force 
‘prepared for combat’ may be capable of ‘cur-
tailing human rights abuses, and creat[ing] a 
secure environment in which civilian agen-
cies can address the underlying causes of 
the conflict and address the requirements 
for peace building’ (Ibid: 6–13). Again, the 
military role is defined in terms of a capac-
ity for ‘combat’ as opposed to the develop-
ment of particular approaches for providing 
protection at anything less than an indus-
trial scale. 
This reluctance in operationalising tactical 
approaches to POC is reflected in AJP-3.4(A) 
‘Allied Joint Doctrine For Non-Article 5 Crisis 
Response Operations.’ This makes brief refer-
ences to the necessity for rule of law, high-
lighting support to its restoration as a spe-
cific potential mission - although it sets clear 
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limits in describing this as taking place in 
‘exceptional circumstances’: 
While civilian law enforcement is not 
a NATO function, the latter environ-
ment may require military involve-
ment in support of local law and 
order tasks, including operations to 
maintain local law and order, during 
the initial stages of an operation until 
appropriate civil authorities can re-
sume their tasks.
It also makes clear that these types of opera-
tion require joint planning with other organi-
sations: ‘when appropriate, NATO should seek 
the support of other IOs (like the UN, the EU 
or the OSCE) that have a mandate, resources, 
and experience concerning involvement in 
public security’. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
doctrinal contribution falls far short of pro-
viding an operational concept for POC.
Largely as a response to these and the 
broader challenges encountered in Afghani-
stan, NATO published its NATO Bi-SC Coun-
ter-Insurgency Joint Operational Guidelines 
(JOG) in 26 May 2010 (hereafter JOG 10/01). 
Again there is the traditional emphasis on 
securing the population from the insurgent 
and recognition that ‘early provision of basic 
protection is a key determinant for sustain-
able progress because political progress is 
unlikely to take place in the midst of chronic 
human insecurity’ (Beadle 2010). Similar to 
the UK JDP 3–40, it provides some detail on 
possible protection tasks, such as ‘protecting 
civilians from local bandits in refugee camps, 
escorting humanitarian convoys, patrolling 
in villages, and the importance of protecting 
civilians from attacks at night.’(JOG 10/01: 
513–515) 
Other Countries and International 
Organisations
The United States, the United Kingdom and 
NATO are not alone in producing doctri-
nal approaches to POC. William Durch and 
Allison Giffen (2010: 21–84) suggest that 
both the European Union and the African 
Union have made some progress in devel-
oping guidelines and operationalising POC. 
The European Union has produced a range of 
guidelines and has also gained some experi-
ence of POC in peacekeeping with deploy-
ments in both Congos and in Chad whilst in 
2009–2010 the African Union developed its 
‘Draft Guidelines for the Protection of Civil-
ians by African Union Peace Support Missions.’
Whereas NATO has tended to address civil-
ian protection either in terms of IHL or as a 
component of a broader political and mili-
tary strategy, the United Nations has taken a 
different approach, focusing more on civilian 
protection as a discrete aim in itself, although 
this is a relatively new development. Histori-
cally the UN Security Council, even in the 
course of enforcement action, has generally 
sought to end wars or force compliance with 
a political objective rather than ‘to intervene 
directly to save civilian lives’ (Holt and Berk-
man 2006: 6). 
The first landmark Resolution was UN 
Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999) 
authorising peacekeepers in Sierra Leone to 
use force to protect civilians ‘under immi-
nent threat’ of physical violence. In 2006, 
the Security Council passed Resolution 1674, 
‘committing it to take action to protect civil-
ians in armed conflict.’ It also increasingly 
established civilian protection elements in 
the mandates of specific missions: MONUC/
MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), UNAMID and UNMIS in the 
Sudan and ACRO in Afghanistan. Eight cur-
rent missions are explicitly mandated by the 
UN Security Council to protect civilians. The 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO)/Department of Field Support (DFS) 
Concept of Operations (2010) describes pro-
tecting civilians as ‘perhaps the single largest 
contribution a mission can make’, and the 
UN Security Council has asserted that civilian 
protection must be considered a priority in 
the allocation of capacity and resources (UN 
Security Council 2009).
Despite these developments civilian pro-
tection has not been without controversy, 
particularly through its linkage with the R2P 
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agenda. Whilst several authors argue that 
civilian protection and R2P are different, the 
concept of civilian protection has ‘become 
deeply associated with R2P which has 
‘polarised the UN community with strong 
opposing views between the North and the 
South’ (De Coning et al. 2008: 5). The asso-
ciation has also risked creating a sense of 
growing militarisation in civilian protection 
approaches. These differences are mirrored 
within the UN Secretariat, where DPKO staff 
themselves tend to link R2P and POC - echo-
ing the position of states supportive of R2P 
such as Australia, Canada, the United King-
dom and New Zealand. In contrast, Lie and 
Carvalho suggest that the Office for the Coor-
dination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
staff ‘are highly reluctant to R2P due to its 
strong militaristic and political connotations. 
To OCHA staff there is a concern of concep-
tual equation between R2P and POC, while 
they also understand the proliferation of R2P 
and its reception at DPKO being due to its 
framing as militaristic and interventionist 
and thus presumably easier to operationalize 
than POC’ (Lie and Carvalho 2009). Interest-
ingly, OCHA staff interviewed for this project 
did not accept such a difference within the 
UN Secretariat.
Despite the tendency to presume linkages, 
several authors seek to establish clear differ-
ences between civilian protection and R2P. 
The Asia Pacific Centre, for example, draws 
a distinction between two types of situations 
in which the protection of civilians occurs. 
The first is where ‘[c]ivilian protection [is] an 
important, but not primary, mission objec-
tive operation’ whilst the second is where 
protecting civilians is ‘clearly the primary 
objective where missions are mandated to 
use all necessary means to prevent or halt 
genocide, ethnic cleansing or systematic and 
widespread abuses.’ The former is charac-
terised as civilian protection whilst the lat-
ter is characteristic of R2P norms. Charles 
Hunt draws a slightly different distinction, 
arguing that whilst civilian protection and 
R2P may rooted in the same principles, they 
remain distinct, ‘in essence, R2P focuses on 
preventing and stopping the most horren-
dous crimes (genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity) 
whether they occur within the context of 
armed conflicts or not. The concept of civil-
ian protection focuses on the broader list of 
specific threats, vulnerabilities and needs of 
civilian populations in armed conflicts, from 
physical security to food security and other 
humanitarian needs’ (Hunt 2008: 1–4).
The controversies arising from the per-
ceived linkage of R2P and civilian protection 
extend to peacekeepers’ rules of engagement 
governing the use of force. When UN unof-
ficial policy became ‘that when peacekeepers 
saw violence perpetrated against civilians, 
they should be “presumed to be authorised 
to stop it, within their means”’, this was 
viewed by many as invoking Chapter VII 
enforcement provisions through the back 
door as well as potentially impacting overall 
mission impartiality and state sovereignty 
(Blatter 2011: 3). 
Obstacles to a Coherent Military 
Role in Protection 
While many on either side of the humani-
tarian-military divide recognise that comple-
mentary protection strategies are necessary, 
interaction at strategic and operational levels 
has faced numerous challenges. The humani-
tarian community has struggled to reach a 
consensus on civil–military coordination in 
general, and there are some who reject any 
form of interaction. For their part, interna-
tional military and peacekeeping forces have 
at times been dismissive of the contribution 
that humanitarian actors can make to the 
safety and security of civilians. For both, fun-
damental differences in culture, terminology, 
priorities and approaches pose real chal-
lenges to constructive interaction on protec-
tion and other humanitarian issues.
The concept of civilian protection also 
faces many challenges in common with the 
R2P agenda, and there is a raft of additional 
obstacles, several of which also confront 
peacekeeping missions as a whole. These 
include: ambiguous or under-resourced man-
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dates, insufficient troop numbers, weak tac-
tical transport and logistics infrastructure 
and, lastly, competing demands and pri-
orities. The DPKO/DFS ‘New Horizon’ paper 
puts this succinctly in stating that ‘the scale 
and complexity of peacekeeping today are 
mismatched with existing capabilities. The 
demands of the past decade have exposed 
the limitations of past reforms and the basic 
systems, structures and tools of an organiza-
tion not designed for the size, tempo and 
tasks of today’s missions’ (UN DPKO/DFS 
2009: 21).
In 2008, DPKO and OCHA commissioned an 
independent study to review the UN’s record 
of civilian protection. This study, Protecting 
Civilians in the Context of Peacekeeping: Suc-
cess, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges, is 
perhaps the most important analysis of civil-
ian protection to date. It concluded that the 
‘presumed chain of events to support protec-
tion of civilians - from the earliest planning, 
to Security Council mandates to the imple-
mentation of mandates by peacekeeping 
missions in the field - is broken’ (Holt et al. 
2011). Whilst an analysis of many of these 
challenges is beyond the scope of this paper, 
the problems caused by the poverty of mili-
tary and police doctrine dealing with civilian 
protection is not. Within the literature there 
is a striking consensus on the idea that the 
absence of doctrine focusing on the role of 
UN military and police in delivering civil-
ian protection has accentuated many of the 
broader difficulties confronting peacekeep-
ing missions as a whole. In particular the 
ambiguity of UN Security Council mandates 
has placed pressure on commanders to rec-
oncile a shortage of resources and numerous 
competing priorities. Arguably the imprecise 
language concerning civilian protection in 
most peacekeeping mandates ‘stretches the 
concept beyond what is functional’ whilst 
commanders are provided with little guid-
ance on how to interpret particularly the key 
phrase contained in protection mandates of 
civilians ‘under imminent threat of physical 
violence’ (Beadle 2010: 19). Giffen continues 
this theme, arguing that there is a continu-
ing requirement to clarify the language that 
is commonly used in the protection ele-
ments of Security Council Resolutions. Using 
an excerpt from SCR 1590 (2005), part of 
the mandate of the UN Mission in the Sudan 
(UNMIS), as an exemplar, she draws attention 
to frequently used and ambiguous phrases in 
protection mandates. 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter of the United Nations, (i) Decides 
that UNMIS is authorized to take the 
necessary action, in the areas of its de-
ployment of its forces and as it deems 
within its capabilities, {…} and, with-
out prejudice to the responsibility of 
the government of Sudan, to protect 
civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence.
In the absence of greater specificity or 
guidance, the language of protection used 
in mandates creates a recipe for differing 
benchmarks of risk and priorities even across 
the same mission (Pearson Centre 2010). 
Existing doctrines have simply ‘fallen short 
in providing guidance on how to go about 
protecting civilians, leaving it to those plan-
ning and implementing such operations to 
develop the conceptual approaches required 
to turn ambition into reality as they go’ 
(Giffen 2010: 7). Peacekeeping commanders 
are therefore often forced to improvise their 
response, ensuring that civilian protection 
by peacekeepers has developed a distinctly 
ad hoc approach. Nevertheless, the growth 
in protection mandates has driven innova-
tion in the field and some of this has been 
captured in terms of guidelines - although 
much of this work currently remains under 
construction (Holt and Berkman 2006). 
There is a growing literature reflecting 
innovations in the field (De Coning et al. 
2011); MONUC (now MONUSCO) in the DRC 
and UNAMID in Darfur have both provided 
a particularly fertile ground for innovation 
and ‘lesson learning’ despite the extreme dif-
ficulties of their operational environments 
and the paucity of their resources (DPKO/
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DFS 2010: 34). Innovations have generally 
been practical in nature: the increasing use 
of quick-response forces, proactive pres-
ence patrolling, temporary basing in threat-
ened areas, early-warning systems, ‘firewood 
patrols’ and efforts to create coherent and 
multidisciplinary operational concepts for 
protection. Both missions have incorporated 
civilians into planning clusters and ‘Joint 
Protection Teams’, the latter conducting 
‘assessments in cooperation with military 
peacekeepers’ (Weir 2010: 25). They both 
also provide a civilian interface between the 
mission and local communities and work 
with community leaders and uniformed 
peacekeepers to develop concrete, localised 
protection strategies that use all available 
protection resources to keep civilians safe’ 
(Weir 2010: 25).
Many of these innovations were captured 
in the DPKO/DFS Lessons Learned Note on 
the Protection of Civilians, which, apart from 
recording tactical innovations, stressed the 
importance of portraying protection as ‘an 
operational-level objective’ within the com-
mander’s concept of operations. This adap-
tation would make clear the commander’s 
principal intent of protecting civilians and 
help to prioritise this in relation to the mul-
titude of other tasks confronting subordi-
nate commanders. 
The first significant document to describe 
protection as a crosscutting issue was the 
UN’s 2008 Capstone Doctrine (DPKO/DFS 
2008). However, Holt et al. criticise it for 
failing to provide an ‘operational definition 
around which planning for specific missions’ 
(Holt et al. 2010: 5) could take place - argu-
ably reflecting both the challenge of produc-
ing a clear definition and the absence of a 
consensus on what was meant by the term 
in practice. In part, the drafters of Security 
Council Resolution 1894 (2009) endeav-
oured to remedy precisely these issues, reit-
erating the Security Council’s commitment 
to civilian protection, but also requesting the 
‘Secretary-General to develop in close consul-
tation with Member States, including troop 
and police contributing countries and other 
relevant actors, an operational concept for 
the protection of civilians, and to report back 
on progress made’ (UNSCR 1894 - 2009: 22).
In 2010 the DPKO produced the Draft 
DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Pro-
tection of Civilians in United Nations Peace-
keeping Operations. It refers to a three-tiered, 
mutually reinforcing framework for con-
ceptualizing peacekeepers’ contributions 
to the protection of civilians (DPKO/DFS 
2010b: 15). These include: Tier 1 - Protection 
through political processes; Tier 2 - Providing 
protection from physical violence; and Tier 
3 - Establishing a protective environment. 
It also makes clear that the approach ‘goes 
beyond the domain of physical protection 
from imminent threat’ (DPKO/DFS 2010b: 
4), encouraging a multidisciplinary approach 
to planning and delivery that enables the 
three tiers to be mutually reinforcing and 
‘taken forward simultaneously’ (DPKO/DFS 
2010b: 15). The draft paper also outlines the 
phases in which protection may be required:
1. ‘passive presence to assure civilians of 
the mission’s intent to protect them as 
well as to deter potential aggressors;
2. pre-emption in cases where assurance 
and prevention is insufficient, which 
might include enhanced political pres-
sure and more proactive and visible 
military and police deployment;
3. response to threats of imminent physi-
cal violence to civilians such as troops 
taking position between the popula-
tion and hostile elements; and
4. consolidation in the post-crisis situ-
ations that aim to assist the popula-
tion and host government to return to 
normality through political dialogue 
and enquiries into human rights viola-
tions’ (Beadle 2010: 18).
Whilst representing a significant improve-
ment, several issues require further clarifi-
cation if commanders are to be able to rely 
on the document as an aid to their decision 
making. The drafters do not offer a definitive 
definition of the concept, largely because 
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of the political sensitivities involved. Whilst 
undoubtedly a pragmatic response to the 
practical and political challenges of this, 
these ‘grey areas have been raised by practi-
tioners as some of the most difficult to tackle 
in theatre, and as such would need further 
clarification’ (Giffen 2011: 8).
Despite the tiers being intended to be 
mutually reinforcing, the document provides 
little guidance on how to approach deci-
sions requiring trade-offs between multiple 
competing priorities in a resource-starved 
environment. In particular, balancing short 
term and long-term objectives, making judg-
ments between competing protection cases 
or between protection objectives and wider 
purposes such as monitoring the peace 
agreement or the disengagement of belliger-
ent forces (Kelly and Giffen 2011). These are 
particularly challenging issues as the paper 
also makes clear that ‘perhaps the single 
largest contribution a mission can make is to 
protecting civilians’ (DPKO/DFS 2010b: 18).
Furthermore, the paper provides little 
guidance on how to balance the use of force 
against the need to manage the strategic con-
sent of the host state. Situations, in which 
the host government’s forces also engage 
in the abuse of civilians, such as in the DRC, 
create particular dilemmas for peacekeeping 
missions with protection elements in their 
mandates. Understandably this is likely to be 
a politically sensitive issue - raising many of 
the same problems found in the R2P debates, 
but also potentially encroaching upon the 
sensitivities of states that provide troops to 
peacekeeping missions with clear caveats on 
their usage. These states are understandably 
sensitive about a concept that potentially 
enables or creates pressures to allow their 
pre-emptive use against a host state. 
Giffen (2011: 1–4), in her paper on the 
trajectory of POC operationalisation within 
the DPKO, suggests that the work of the 
Secretariat continues to focus on five par-
ticular areas:
•	 the development of a strategic frame-
work to provide guidance for missions 
in elaborating comprehensive strategies 
for the protection of civilians;
•	 pre-deployment and in-mission train-
ing modules that include a range of 
scenario-based exercises for all mission 
components;
•	 an evaluation of the resource and capa-
bility requirements for the implementa-
tion of protection of civilian mandates; 
•	 a though examination of protection 
planning processes, both pre-deploy-
ment and within the mission; and 
•	 capability development efforts, includ-
ing addressing capability standards for 
military units, to better articulate the 
performance requirements to meet this 
task as well as the other modern man-
dated peacekeeping tasks.
Of these, the two most challenging are the 
development of an operational concept that 
will encourage greater clarity in mandate for-
mulation and the ability to bridge the gap 
between mandate ambiguity and mission 
reality. Equally difficult will be the efforts to 
turn the matrix of POC tasks and the range 
of capabilities necessary to implement POC 
into resources that member states are willing 
to contribute. As Erin Weir suggests ‘these 
efforts will show no results if peacekeepers 
are left blind, overstretched and immobile. 
Peacekeeping missions routinely operate 
with a shortage of troops, civilian staff and 
equipment in some of the most insecure and 
logistically challenging environments in the 
world’ (Weir 2010: ii). In contrast, efforts to 
incorporate more systematically POC issues 
into the integrated mission planning process 
(IMPP) and to develop POC training packages 
of the type currently under consideration by 
UNITAR are comparatively straightforward 
(UNGA 2010: 148).
New Doctrinal Approaches to 
Civilian Protection Strategies 
Not all the work on developing POC con-
cepts has been conducted by international 
organisations or states. Sarah Sewall, Dwight 
Raymond and Sally Chin (2010), for example, 
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have produced the Mass Atrocity Response 
Operations (MARO) handbook aimed at 
developing an international approach to 
the ‘prevention of the mass killing of civil-
ians’. It parallels some of the work being 
undertaken by DPKO, exploring concep-
tual approaches to atrocity situations, mili-
tary planning as well as signposting future 
research and operationalisation. It also pro-
vides a range of practical approaches span-
ning preventive action (such as shaping and 
deterring), intervention (seizing the initia-
tive and dominating ground) and rebuild-
ing (through stabilisation and supporting 
civilian authorities). Despite the document 
being essentially a practical guide for policy 
makers and military commanders, it also 
serves a political purpose within the US secu-
rity establishment. Whilst the issue of mass 
atrocities is briefly touched upon in several 
major US strategy documents (including the 
National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial 
Defense Review, and the US Army Operat-
ing Concept) there are many within the US 
military who view civilian protection gener-
ally as a problem of political engagement 
and will rather than an issue that requires a 
military doctrinal response. Sewall et al. view 
the problem rather differently, suggesting 
that in the absence of doctrine the military 
are inadequately prepared to respond or to 
provide courses of action to policy makers. 
Echoing the approach of the DPKO/DFS, 
the authors advocate translating the ‘MARO’ 
concept into ‘military doctrine and training 
in order to provide guidance on genocide 
prevention and response. While the context 
of each mass atrocity may be different, there 
are some common themes that have impor-
tant implications for the operational and 
political planning of intervention’ (Sewell et 
al. 2010: 43).
Conclusions
The slow evolution of civilian protection as a 
shared objective between international mili-
tary and peacekeeping forces and humanitar-
ian actors presents both opportunities and 
challenges. The challenges include, above all 
else, the need to develop synergies to amelio-
rate civilian suffering in situations of armed 
conflict whilst also limiting the potentially 
harmful consequences of full integration. 
This presents real dilemmas for humanitar-
ian organisations seeking to maximise pro-
tection outcomes for the civilian population 
whilst also maintaining the perceptions of 
neutrality and impartiality that are so vital 
to their broader assistance strategies. Clearly 
this difficulty is most apparent in situations 
where the international military forces are 
perceived to be party to the conflict.
However it is essential to interact with 
armed actors not only to advocate for com-
pliance with their duties as arms bearers and 
responsibility holders under international 
law, but also to maintain an understanding 
of mutual roles and mandates. It is also possi-
ble to manage the risks of engaging military 
or peacekeeping forces in protection strate-
gies alongside humanitarian actors; saving 
lives requires a more coordinated approach. 
Elsewhere Metcalfe (2012) argues that the 
key to this is consistent and transparent dia-
logue that explains the appropriate param-
eters for interaction. Similarly it is vital that 
humanitarians are included from the earli-
est stages of the military or peacekeeping 
deployment in order to shape the military 
understanding of the nature of protection 
threats as well as the limits and potential 
of action. Even in situations where humani-
tarian principles are compromised by direct 
interaction between humanitarian organi-
sations and military, she suggests there is 
still scope for interaction, arguing that ‘con-
tact may be made indirectly through inter-
locutors such as OCHA, the protection clus-
ter or working group on the ground, and 
more detailed guidance on information-
sharing, confidentiality and informed con-
sent would help minimize risks to sources 
and victims.’
In terms of trends in the military con-
tribution to civilian protection, one of the 
most significant challenges lies in convert-
ing civilian protection from a low-priority 
objective to an operational-level priority. 
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In terms of the development of doctrine 
and guidance on this, it is clear that civil-
ian protection is gradually insinuating itself 
into a range of military doctrines, although 
progress has been remarkably slow. The 
United Nations leads the development both 
of an operational concept as well as efforts 
to promote civilian protection as an opera-
tional priority. 
NATO and NATO member states have been 
slow to produce doctrines that operation-
alises the concept, although fragments of 
a viable approach, combining restrictions 
on arms bearers and support to the civilian 
population, could be fashioned into a viable 
operational concept. However, the challenge 
is to produce greater coherence between the 
disparate elements and to make civilian pro-
tection a more central component of doctrine 
- in other words to provide a unifying idea 
around which a concept of operations can 
coalesce. Whilst the British doctrine appears 
to go further than that of other NATO states 
in producing an operational concept, it lags 
considerably behind the UN approach. 
More positively, most military doctrines 
are part of a firm consensus that civilian 
protection requires a ‘whole of mission’ or 
‘comprehensive approach’ - in part due to 
its multifaceted nature and also to develop 
synergies between scarce mission resources. 
Equally, there is almost universal recognition 
that civilian protection planning and civilian 
agencies need to be incorporated early in 
the mission planning cycle, particularly if it 
is to offer an approach that is anything more 
than reactive.
Notes
 1 For a discussion on the development of 
the civilian protection norm see Victo-
ria Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly, 
‘Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Set-
backs and Remaining Challenges’, OCHA/
DPKO Jointly commissioned study, No-
vember 2009. Hereafter Holt et al., See 
also Jon Harald Sande Lie ‘Responsibility 
to Protect: Protection of Civilians, the 
Responsibility to Protect and Peace Op-
erations’ NUPI Report No. 4, 2008. For 
the evolving role of humanitarian or-
ganisations in delivering protection see 
HPG Report. 
 2 UN-led missions that have been mandat-
ed to include civilian protection elements 
include UNAMSIL in UNSCR 1270 (1999), 
MONUC in UNSCR 1291 (2000); UNMIL 
in UNSCR 1509 (2003), UNOCI in UNSCR 
1528 (2004), MINUSTAH in UNSCR 1542 
(2004), ONUB in UNSCR 1545 (2004), 
UNMIS in UNSCR 1590 (2005), UNIFIL in 
UNSCR 1701 (2006), UNAMID in UNSCR 
1769 (2007), and MINURCAT in UNSCR 
1778 (2007). Currently active missions 
with a protection of civilians component 
include Cote D’Ivoire (UNOCI), Darfur 
(UNAMID), DRC (MONUSCO), Haiti (MIN-
SUTAH), Lebanon (UNIFIL)’ Liberia (UN-
MIL) and Sudan (UNMIS).
 3 See FM 3–07 para 2–6, figure 3–1, para 
2–25 and para 3–8.
 4 Paragraph 410 states that the whilst pro-
tection tasks will generally be identified 
in the course of the planning process the 
‘military component could expect to be 
involved with: physical protection tasks 
of the most vulnerable population areas; 
the establishment of, or support to, an 
effective reaction force; and support to 
the movement of humanitarian actors 
in non-permissive environments – plus 
many more.’
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